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STATUTORY RAPE IN WISCONSIN:
HISTORY, RATIONALE, AND THE NEED FOR
REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION

Wisconsin middle and high schools are filled with serious sex offenders
and their victims. Yet likely these offenders are unaware they are guilty of
serious felonies and few victims are aware of their victimization. Wisconsin's
statutory rape' laws are unusual2 in that they prohibit not only sexual conduct
between an adult 3 and an underage partner but also criminalize all sexual
conduct involving underage persons, even when that conduct involves peers
and is fully consensual. 4 In the State of Wisconsin, any time a person under
the age of sixteen engages in an act that is more sexually intimate than a kiss,

1. Statutory rape is generally understood to mean "[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with a person
under the age of consent (as defined by statute), regardless of whether it is against that person's will.
Generally, only an adult may be convicted of this crime. A person under the age of consent cannot be
convicted." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1288 (8th ed. 2004). The term is used in this Comment to
refer to consensual sexual contact that is prohibited because of a participant's age. See Charles A.
Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity Between Teenagers, 12
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 373, 433-34 (2003).
2. See Britton Guerrina, Comment, Mitigating Punishmentfor Statutory Rape, 65 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1251, 1254 (1998) ("Although some states continue to have bright line age-of-consent statutes
on the books, most states have recognized that such laws are ill-adapted to the contemporary
complexity of sexual relationships."); see also supra note 1 (definition of statutory rape); infra note
93 and accompanying text (explaining that Wisconsin is one of only five states that does not
incorporate an age-gap into its statutory rape laws).
3. This Comment carefully utilizes words that carry a connotation of age. "Child" generally
refers to the age classification encompassed in section 948.02(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes and
means all those under the age of thirteen, except when utilized in reference to a statute, such as
"second degree sexual assault of a child" or in reference to "child molestation." "Adolescent" refers
to the age classification encompassed in section 948.02(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes and refers to
those who are at least thirteen but under sixteen. "Young adult" refers to the classification
encompassed in section 948.09 of the Wisconsin Statutes and refers to those who are at least sixteen
but not yet eighteen. "Juvenile" is used to refer to all those under the age eighteen, "adult" is used to
refer to all those above the age of eighteen, and "underage" is used to refer to persons below the age
of consent.
4. "Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the
age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony." WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1) (2003-2004). "Whoever has
sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty
of a Class C felony." § 948.02(2). "Whoever has sexual intercourse with a child who is not the
defendant's spouse and who has attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." §
948.09.
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a serious felony is committed.5 Should both partners be underage, then by the
same act each is simultaneously a victim and a perpetrator. 6
Statutorily mandating adolescence devoid of all sexual intimacy is
unrealistic and an imprudent legislative decision. Wisconsin should reform its
laws, as has nearly every other state, 7 taking into account the vast difference
between a stereotypical case of child molestation and a consensual peer
relationship, and should focus upon protecting children and adolescents from
coerced sexual conduct.
This Comment begins in Part II with briefly tracing the history of
statutory rape laws generally, and then Part III surveys the development of the
law in Wisconsin. Part IV outlines the four most commonly cited rationales
for maintaining statutory rape laws, and Part V explains how these rationales
are either inherently irrational or unsatisfied by Wisconsin's law. Part VI
offers alternatives to Wisconsin's scheme. Part VII details the components of
a better statutory rape law for Wisconsin, explains how statutory rape reform
would require the reform of a variety of related statutes, and finally suggests
the development of parental restraining orders as a novel alternative to
traditional statutory rape laws.
II. HISTORY OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS
Statutory rape laws originated in thirteenth-century England and at that
time prohibited sexual relations between adults and girls under the age of
twelve. 8 In the late sixteenth century, the age of consent was lowered to ten. 9
These initial prohibitions were gender specific, restricting only a male's
sexual relations with young females, and sought to "protect a father's interest

5. This is a result of the broad definition of "sexual contact." Sexual contact is defined, in part,

as the following:
Intentional touching by the complainant or defendant, either directly or through
clothing by the use of any body part or object, of the complainant's or
defendant's intimate parts if that intentional touching is either for the purpose of
sexually degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing
or gratifying the defendant.
§ 948.01(5)(a). "Intimate parts" is defined as "the breast, buttock, anus, groin, scrotum, penis, vagina
or pubic mound of a human being." § 939.22(19).
6. This is a consequence of the use of the gender and age neutral word "whoever."
§ 948.02.
7. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
8. Michelle Oberman, Gender Issues and the Criminal Law: Turning Girls Into Women: ReevaluatingModern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 24 (1994).

9. Id.
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in his daughter's chastity."' l Traditionally, a non-virgin was not as desirable
for marriage and an unmarried daughter was a financial liability for her
father. l"

The ten-year-old age of consent was initially adopted in the United States,
but in the late nineteenth century, led in large part by the Women's Christian
Temperance Union and similar groups, campaigns were launched to increase
the age of consent in an effort to further protect girls from male sexual
aggression. 12 States13gradually increased the age of consent, in some cases as
high as twenty-one.
In the 1970s, a new generation of feminists recognized that gender
specific statutory rape laws perpetuated negative stereotypes regarding the
vulnerability of women. 14 However, rather than seeking the abolition of
statutory rape laws, those feminists generally called for reforms to make the
laws gender neutral and thus remove the implication that only females
are
15
protection.
of
need
in
are
juveniles
all
rather
but
inherently vulnerable,
III. HISTORY OF WISCONSIN'S STATUTORY RAPE LAWS

Wisconsin adopted a gender neutral statutory rape law in 1976 as part of a
larger reform to remove gender biases from Wisconsin laws.1 6 Prior to 1976,
all sexual intercourse with underage females was criminal, but severity of
17
punishment depended upon the age of both the victim and the perpetrator.
Sexual intercourse between an adult male and a female under the age of
twelve was punished most severely, with a possibility of thirty years in
prison.1 8 If the female was at least twelve years old but under sixteen, the
maximum penalty for an adult male was fifteen years in prison. 19 Finally, if a
female was under eighteen, the male may have been imprisoned for as long as
five years. ° This lowest level of punishment could also apply to juvenile
males who had sexual intercourse with underage females, regardless of the
10. Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex With Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory
Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 703, 754 (2000).
11. Id. at 754-55.

12. Jane E. Larson, Even a Worm Will Turn at Last: Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century
America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 3-4 (1997).
13. Oberman, supra note 8, at 24.
14. Oberman, supra note 10, at 757.
15. Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Act of June 28, 1976, ch. 421, §§ 470-71, 1975 Wis. Sess. Laws 1361, 1386.
See Wis. STAT. § 944.10 (1973-1974).
§ 944.10(3).
§ 944.10(2).
§ 944.10(1).
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female's age; age of the female was only relevant if the male was an adult.2 '
With the 1976 reform, Wisconsin punished statutory rape no longer as a
"Crime[ ] Against Sexual Morality '22 as the state had done previously, but
now as a form of sexual assault.23 For example, a person was guilty of first
degree sexual assault if he raped a woman at gunpoint or if he had sexual
contact with a twelve-year-old. 4 Similarly, second degree sexual assault
included a person who violently raped as well as a person who had sexual
contact with any person under the age of eighteen. 25
Wisconsin greatly weakened its statutory rape laws in the 1976 reform.
First, sexual intercourse with a child would now bring a maximum of only
fifteen years in prison for the youngest victims 26 whereas previously the
maximum was thirty.27 Second, although it was assumed that a minor could
not consent, this presumption could be rebutted if the victim was at least
fifteen years old.28 Thus, persons fifteen to eighteen years old were granted a
degree of sexual autonomy but still protected from coerced sex that did not
otherwise rise to the level of sexual assault.2 9 In one respect, however, the
statutory rape laws were strengthened in that not only was sexual intercourse
prohibited but also sexual contact.3°
This reformed law was gender neutral, for the first time punishing the acts
of both males and females. 31 But arguably more significant, this law was also
age neutral, thus criminalizing the conduct even when both partners were
21. See id. Subsection (1) contains no requirement that the male be over eighteen whereas that
requirement is included in subsections (2) and (3). See § 944.10.
22. WIS. STAT. ch. 944 (1973-1974).
23. Act of Mar. 26, 1976, ch. 184, 1975 Wis. Sess. Laws 582 (codified at Wis. STAT. § 940.225

(1975-1976)).
24. See WIS. STAT. § 940.225(1)(b), (d) (1975-1976).

25. See § 940.225(2)(a), (e).
26. § 940.225(1).
27. WIS. STAT. § 944.10(3) (1973-1974).
28. WIS. STAT. § 940.225(4)(a) (1975-1976).
29. Consensual sexual intercourse among all non-married persons could still have been
prosecuted as the misdemeanor of fornication. WIS. STAT. § 944.15 (1975-1976).
30. Sexual contact was defined as the following:
any intentional touching of the intimate parts, clothed or unclothed, of a person
to the intimate parts, clothed or unclothed of another, or the intentional touching
by hand, mouth or object of the intimate parts, clothed or unclothed, of another,
if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose
of sexual arousal or gratification or if such touching contains the elements of
actual or attempted sexual battery as defined in s. 940.20.
§ 940.225(5)(b).
31. The gender-neutral word "whoever" was used, § 940.225, in place of "any male," Wis.
STAT. § 944.10 (1973-1974).
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underage. 32 However, because the law allowed for a fifteen-year-old to
consent,33 mutual prosecution of peer partners was effectively impossible
except when both partners were under the age of fifteen.
Penalties were enhanced in 1977 so that first degree sexual assault carried
with it a potential punishment of up to twenty years in prison and second
degree sexual assault carried with it a possibility of ten years in prison.34
In 1982, Wisconsin eliminated the possibility that a fifteen-year-old could
consent to sexual activity and turned sexual contact or intercourse with an
underage person into a strict liability crime. 35 At the same time, however, the
legislature lowered the age of consent from eighteen to sixteen.36 Thus,
sexual contact or intercourse with a minor who was at least sixteen was no
longer criminal because of the person's age. However, sexual intercourse
involving a young adult, and in fact all non-marital sexual intercourse,
remained punishable as the misdemeanor of fornication.3 7 A year later, the
legislature repealed its broad prohibition of all non-marital sexual intercourse
but specifically re-criminalized sexual intercourse with a young adult as a
misdemeanor, although a marriage exception was provided. 38
In 1988, the legislature reorganized its statutory rape laws and compiled
the scattered statutes into the newly created Chapter 948, "Crimes Against
Children."3 9 The laws remained substantively similar to earlier laws, but the
legislature created a new crime punishing a person responsible for a child or
adolescent's welfare for failing to prevent the sexual assault of that child or
adolescent.4 °
32. WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (1975-1976).

33. § 940.225(4)(a).
34. Act of Nov. 23, 1977, ch. 173, § 3, 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws 728, 729-30 (codified at Wis.
STAT. §§ 939.50(3)(b)-(c), 940.225(1)-(2) (1977-1978)).
35. Act of Apr. 30, 1982, ch. 308, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 1243 (codified at Wis. STAT. §
940.225 (1981-1982)). The crime remains one of strict liability where mistake of age is no defense,
even when the victim intentionally misrepresents her age, has what appears to be a state-issued
identification card indicating she is nineteen, talks about how she is old enough to work as an exotic
dancer, and appears to be at least nineteen. State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, 6, 272 Wis. 2d 418, 6,
680 N.W.2d 810, 6.
36. Act of Apr. 30, 1982, ch. 308, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 1243 (codified at WIs. STAT. §
940.225(2)(e) (198 1-1982)).
37. WIS. STAT. § 944.15 (1981-1982).
38. Act of May 5, 1983, No. 17, §§ 4-5, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 37, 37-38 (codified at WIS.
STAT. §§ 944.15(2), 944.17(2)(b) (1983-1984). Originally, traditional sexual intercourse with a
young adult was punished as a felony, while oral or anal intercourse was punishable as a
misdemeanor, but the penalty for traditional sexual intercourse was amended to a misdemeanor about
two months later. Act of July 1, 1983, No. 27, § 1790e, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 55, 554.
39. Act of Apr. 20, 1988, No. 332, § 55, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 1178, 1183-92 (codified at Wis.
STAT. § 948.02(3) (1987-1988)).
40. Id.
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This 1988 revision is largely where the law remains today. The only
significant subsequent changes have been increases in the possible penalties.
In 1994, the maximum penalty for first degree sexual assault of a child was
doubled from twenty years to forty years.4 1 In 1995, the penalty for second
degree sexual assault of a child was doubled from a possibility of ten years to
a maximum of twenty years.4 2 Penalties were again increased in 1998 where
first degree sexual assault of a child carried a maximum punishment of up to
sixty years in prison and second degree carried a maximum of up to thirty
years in prison.43 Finally, in 2002, the punishment for second degree sexual
assault of a child was again increased and now carries up to forty years
imprisonment.4 4 There has been a recent effort to further increase the penalty
for first degree sexual assault of a child to allow for life imprisonment.45
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR STATUTORY RAPE LAWS

The motivation for statutory rape laws evolved from a desire to protect a
father's financial interest in his daughter's chastity 46 into a desire to protect
all juveniles from the sexual predations of adults.47 In Wisconsin, however,
the rationale underlying statutory rape laws has shifted again, as indicated by
the fact that Wisconsin punishes all sexual contact involving children or
adolescents and not just sexual intercourse between a child or adolescent and
an adult.4 8 Wisconsin's prohibition of all sexual conduct involving those
under the age of sixteen 49 leads to the obvious question: Why would the
legislature regard the prevention of adolescent sexual conduct as such a
serious priority, equivalent in punishment to crimes such as armed robbery5 °
or kidnapping? 5 1 Reasons most commonly cited for enforcing statutory rape
laws are: (1) protect young people from coerced sexual activity; (2) enforce
41. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, No. 194, § 9, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 919, 920 (codified at Wis. STAT. §

939.50(3) (1993-1994)).
42. Act of Nov. 16, 1995, No. 69, §§ 4, 5, 12, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws. 979, 981-82 (codified at
WIs. STAT. §§ 939.50(3)(bc), 948.02(2) (1995-1996)).
43. Act of June 15, 1998, No. 283, §§ 322-23, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 2096, 2129 (codified at
WIs. STAT. § 939.50(3)(b)-(c) (1997-1998)).
44. Act of July 26, 2002, No. 109, § 546, 552-53, 879, 2001 Wis. Sess. Laws 1327, 1532, 1552
(codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 939.50(3)(c), 948.02(2) (2001-2002)).
45. S.B. 490, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003).
46. Oberman, supra note 10, at 754.
47. Larson, supra note 12, at 3-4.
48. See Wis. STAT. § 948.02 (2003-2004).
49. Id.
50. § 943.32(2).
51. § 940.31.
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morality; (3) prevent teen pregnancy; and (4) reduce welfare dependence.
A. Protect Young Peoplefrom Coerced Sexual Activity
Prevention of coerced sexual activity is perhaps the most often cited
rationale for statutory rape laws. 52 Legislatures presume that the power
disparity inherent in a relationship between a juvenile and an adult translates
into a juvenile's inability to resist an adult's coercive influence. 53 An
alternative but similar rationale justifies prohibiting peer conduct; a juvenile,
because of his immaturity, is incapable of meaningful consent and thus any
conduct involving a juvenile is inherently nonconsensual. It is this rationale
that underlies other legal protections afforded juveniles such as the ability to
avoid contracts.5 4 Thus, a person who engages in sexual conduct with a
juvenile is taking advantage of that juvenile's inherent vulnerability and
should be punished, even when that person is himself equally in need of
protection because of his immaturity.
B. Enforce Morality
Some people believe that any sexual conduct outside of marriage is
inherently immoral. Juveniles, in nearly every situation, are prohibited from
marrying and thus all sexual activity involving juveniles can be seen as
immoral. Additionally, those who do not believe in such a staunch moralistic
ideal may nevertheless believe that sexual activity involving juveniles is
immoral and should be dissuaded on the basis that all sexual conduct requires
a level of maturity that juveniles are incapable of possessing. Essentially, a
person may believe that sexuality is inextricably tied to morality and juveniles
lack sufficient capacity to make the decision to engage in such conduct. Thus,
as is true with so many other undesirable activities, dissuasion is attempted by
criminalization.
C. Prevent Teen Pregnancy
If underage sexual intercourse is illegal, then any time an underage girl
52. See, e.g., Oberman, supra note 10, at 757.
53. See, e.g., id. Wisconsin, like many other states, has laws punishing as a separate and more
serious crime sexual relationships between juveniles and persons in a relationship of trust or
authority, such as teachers, where a power disparity is most likely to occur. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §
948.095 (2003-2004). Those laws are not addressed in this Comment.
54. Oberman, supra note 8, at 43-44.
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becomes pregnant or a juvenile male fathers a child, a crime has been
committed. If juveniles are forbidden from having sex, they are essentially
forbidden from becoming pregnant. Prohibitions of sexual activities short of
reproductive sexual intercourse can be rationalized because they may lead to
sexual intercourse. Prohibitions on sexual intercourse that does not result in
pregnancy can be rationalized because of the inherent risk of pregnancy. As
is true with any crime, if the intent is to deter the conduct, it is irrational to
reward by not punishing an offender who does criminal acts but simply fails
in accomplishing the final act.55 Thus all sexual conduct is criminal rather
than only a resulting pregnancy.
D. Reduce Welfare Dependence

Related to teen pregnancy is the issue of welfare dependence. Within The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), 56 Congress directly connected welfare dependence with teenage
pregnancy and then went the additional step in relating teenage pregnancy
with statutory rape.57 Relying upon two studies that concluded teenage
pregnancies generally involve adult males, Congress concluded that
aggressive enforcement of statutory rapes laws would reduce teen pregnancy
and thus reduce welfare expenditures. 58 Therefore, Congress mandated the
Attorney General to develop a program to encourage aggressive enforcement
of statutory rape laws. 59
V.

WISCONSIN'S LAW IS INEFFECTIVE AND IRRATIONAL

The rationales listed above are either irrational or unsatisfied by
Wisconsin's laws. All these public policy rationales could be better served by
55. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 381 (3d ed. 2001).

56. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
57. A problem in the law is that when Congress discussed teen pregnancy it meant "teen"
pregnancy and included the pregnancies of eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds. CAROLYN E. COCCA,
JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 99 (2004). There is
further evidence that Congress' data was manipulated to create the impression of an epidemic. Id.
For example, Congress relied upon teen pregnancy rates rather than teen birth rates, included
pregnancies among married teens, and used data from 1991, a year that demonstrated an anomalous
increase in what was a steady decline of the teen birthrate from the 1950s to 2000. Id.
58. Rigel Oliveri, Note, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform,
52 STAN. L. REv. 463, 472-73 (2000) (citing David J. Landry & Jacqueline Dorroch Forrest, How
Old Are U.S. Fathers?, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 159, 160 (1995); Mike Males & Kenneth S.Y. Chew,
The Ages ofFathers in CaliforniaAdolescent Births, 1993, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 565, 567 (1996)).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14016 (2005).
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a modified law.
A. Wisconsin Fails to ProtectJuvenilesfrom CoercedSexual Activity
Non-consensual sexual conduct is prohibited under Wisconsin law by a
statutory chapter 60 entirely separate from the chapter regulating sexual
conduct involving juveniles. 61 Absent the child sexual assault laws, juveniles,
and all persons, are protected from non-consensual sexual contact.62 Thus,
when a juvenile is alleged to have been subjected to sexual intercourse
without consent, the prosecutor has the option of pursuing charges under the
non-consent statutes 63 or under the child sexual assault statutes. 64 In certain
instances, the punishments under either charge may be the same. 65 But the
prosecutor is given the advantage of being able to secure a conviction and
significant punishment without having to prove the additional and often most
difficult element of lack of consent when he pursues charges under the child
sexual assault statutes 66 as opposed to the generally applicable sexual assault
statutes. 67
Juveniles are obviously afforded substantially more protection than are
adults given that even when a prosecutor may have a difficult time proving a
lack of consent, the perpetrator may still be prosecuted for the strict liability
crime of child sexual assault. However, this additional protection comes at a
price. Essentially, juveniles sacrifice all sexual freedom in exchange for
enhanced legal protection from non-consensual sexual activity.
Although this may be seen as a necessary consequence of the legislature's
desire to effectively protect juveniles, the laws are ineffective in protecting
juveniles from non-consensual sexual conduct. The laws are effective in
regulating sexual conduct involving only juveniles and adults or sexual
conduct involving a juvenile of one age-group and a juvenile from another
age-group. Juveniles who are coerced or pressured into sexual activity by

60. WIs. STAT. § 940.225 (2003-2004).
61. § 948.02.
62. Id.
63. § 940.225.
64. § 948.02.
65. For example, both first degree sexual assault, § 940.225(1), and first degree sexual assault
of a child, § 948.02(2), are Class B felonies, punishable by up to sixty years in prison, §
939.50(3)(b). Similarly, both second degree sexual assault, § 940.225(2), and second degree sexual
assault of a child, § 948.02(2), are Class C felonies punishable by up to forty years in prison and a

$100,000 fine, § 939.50(3)(c).
66. § 948.02.
67. § 940.225.
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peers 68 are left unprotected. Worse than being unprotected, these victims may
actually be made criminals for their participation in the act.
B. MoralityAlone Is an IrrationalBasisfor Statutory Rape Laws
Because Wisconsin law punishes all sexual acts of children and
adolescents, including consensual acts and non-reproductive sexual acts,
morality is likely the foundational rationale for such a sweeping law.69
However, the Supreme Court recently held, "[T]he fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... ,"0
Wisconsin's child sexual assault statutes have survived past constitutional
challenge,71 and although the Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirmed the
constitutionality of the laws after Lawrence v. Texas, it did so without making
any reference to Lawrence. 72 The argument could be made that criminalizing
fully consensual adolescent sexual conduct is unconstitutional,73 but the likely
outcome is that such laws would survive constitutional challenge given a
juvenile's7 4diminished status and the State's compelling interest in protecting
juveniles.
However, Wisconsin's prohibition of young adult sexual intercourse is
more vulnerable to constitutional challenge because it provides a marriage
exception. 75 The criminality of identical conduct is dependent upon marital
status, and the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected such distinctions based
upon marital status.76
If morality is the rationale for the Wisconsin law, then the Wisconsin law
68. For example, under Wisconsin's current law, two persons who are both at least thirteen but
under sixteen or two persons who are both at least sixteen but under eighteen, could be considered

peers.
69. See COCCA, supra note 57, at 34.
70. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
71. State v. Fisher, 565 N.W.2d 565, 568-70 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
72. State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, 32,272 Wis. 2d 418, 32, 680 N.W.2d 810, 32.
73. Arnold H. Loewy, Statutory Rape in a Post Lawrence v. Texas World, 58 SMU L. REV. 77,
84-88 (2005).
74. Id. at 88. In Lawrence, the Court specifically emphasized that the case did not involve
minors, eliminating a possible rationale for Texas' regulation and therefore implying that states may
legitimately regulate the consensual sexual acts of minors. 539 U.S. at 578. Additionally, the United
States Supreme Court has approved statutory rape laws over equal protection objections even when
such laws punish only the male partner in a consensual peer relationship. Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 475 (1981).
75. WIS. STAT. § 948.09 (2003-2004).
76. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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succeeds as written but fails in implementation. Only aggressive enforcement
would accomplish this goal. Increased and aggressive prosecution is likely to
be far more effective in deterring this immoral conduct than sporadic and ad
hoc prosecutions. Not even all readily detectable crimes are prosecuted. 7 In
the event of an underage girl becoming pregnant, that pregnancy is clear
evidence that a crime has been committed.
The prosecutorial policies of different counties relating to statutory rape
cases are difficult to collect, but the most recent report of such policies
indicate vastly differing schemes.7 8 One county prosecutes all crimes that the
office becomes aware of, believing that it is the job of the legislature to
reform an undesirable law. 79 Another county has implemented a general
policy of prosecuting only cases where there is more than a three year gap in
the partners' ages. 80 Another does not have a set policy but tries to analyze
each case individually and assess the maturity of the participants. 81 And yet
another county generally pursues misdemeanor charges that will be expunged
after counseling is completed. 82
These wildly different prosecutorial policies undermine what is written to
be unambiguous. A clear prohibition becomes clouded in malleable variables
and prosecutorial discretion. Sporadic prosecutions create the impression
among juveniles, and in fact all citizens who are aware that such a prohibition
exists, that the absolute prohibition is an historical remnant from a moralistic
past, equivalent to other unutilized moralistic laws such as the criminal
prohibition of adultery. 83 A strict prohibition is meaningless without
enforcement, and only consistent enforcement will reinforce the moralistic
message.
C. Wisconsin's Law Is Overbroad,and the State's Interest in Preventing
Teen Pregnancy Would Be Better Served by a NarrowerLaw
If prevention of teenage pregnancy is the motivation for enforcing
statutory rape laws, Wisconsin's law is obviously overbroad in its prohibition
77. See Jeff Cole, DAs Vary Greatly on Underage Sex Cases, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr.
30, 1997, at Al.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id; Associated Press, Dane County DA is Going After Statutory Rape, But the Younger
Person in the Sexual Relationship is Sometimes Dismayed, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 24, 2000,
at 2B.
81. Cole, supra note 77.
82. Id.
83. See Wis. STAT. § 944.16 (2003-2004).
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of non-reproductive sexual conduct. Although the argument could be made
that all intimacy should be prohibited out of the fear that it may lead to sexual
intercourse, applying a single standard to all intimate conduct is potentially
counterproductive to a goal of dissuading intercourse. Juveniles may
internalize the message conveyed in the statutes: all intimate conduct is
equivalent to sexual intercourse. When vastly different conduct is regarded as
equivalent, an adolescent has no motivation to restrain his conduct to the
benign side of the sexual conduct spectrum. Obviously the touching of a
breast does not carry with it the same possibility for consequences as does
sexual intercourse. Yet the statutes treat these acts identically. 84 If the public
policy goal is to reduce teen pregnancy, then oral sex does not carry the same
consequences as does traditional sexual intercourse, but yet again these acts
are treated as legally equivalent.85 If the legislature feels that criminalization
of conduct is necessary to reduce teen pregnancy rates, then a more rational
approach would be to simply criminalize traditional sexual intercourse and
leave non-reproductive sexual conduct as legal alternatives.86
A more direct approach, criminalizing only impregnation,87 rather than all
sexual intercourse, would seem to be a more rational action, but such
criminalization is, in fact, contrary to public policy. If partners are aware that
the father shall be punished for the impregnation, there emerges a motivation
to prevent but also conceal the pregnancy. Stories of young frightened
mothers concealing pregnancies and upon birth, abandoning the child, are
disturbingly common, 88 and there certainly does not need to be another
84. See § 948.02.
85. The touching of a breast is prohibited as "sexual contact," § 948.01(5)(a), and therefore
applies only to those under the age of sixteen, § 948.02. However, oral sex falls under the definition
of "sexual intercourse," § 948.01(6), and is therefore criminalized for all persons under the age of
eighteen, §§ 948.02, 948.09.
86. See Oberman, supra note 10, at 723 ("Petting is a sexual learning experience, a way to
discover how to feel pleasure."). Michigan is an example of a state that explicitly incorporates a
learning curve into its statutory rape laws. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-e (West 2004).
Peer sexual contact is legal provided the partners are at least thirteen years old. § 750.520e. However,
sexual intercourse remains illegal, § 750.520c, until partners reach age sixteen, § 750.520d.
87. Florida is a state that has taken this direct approach and punishes the impregnation of a
child by an adult as a separate and more severe crime than mere sexual intercourse. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 827.04(3) (West 2003).
88. See, e.g., Tom Kertscher, Punishment Varies in Newborn Deaths, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 20, 2004, at Al; Tom Held & Tom Kertscher, Student Left Newborn to Die in
Toilet, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2003, at 1B (reporting that a seventeen-year-old concealed
her pregnancy, gave birth at home, placed the child in a tote bag, and gave the child to her eighteenyear-old boyfriend to get rid of; the boyfriend placed the child in the waste pit of an outdoor portable
toilet, and despite twenty degree temperatures, the child survived after being discovered by a
passerby); Ed Treleven, Girl Charged in Newborn's Suffocation, WIS. ST. J., June 15, 2002, at Al
(reporting that a mother found her eighteen-year-old daughter's dead baby after the daughter gave
birth at home, wrapped the baby in a rug, placed the rug in a plastic bag and threw the bag out; a
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incentive for such actions.
Similarly, the desire to avoid criminal
consequences may pressure mothers into otherwise unwanted abortions.
Further, when the threat of prosecution fails in deterring impregnation,
actual prosecution is problematic. A father has an obligation to support his
child. 89 Should the father not support the child, the child is more likely to
become a state charge, thereby compounding the problem of welfare
dependence. When a father, as a consequence of becoming a father, also
becomes a felon, his ability to provide for that child is greatly minimized. 90
And obviously, should the father be incarcerated, he would not be in a
position to financially support a child let alone be a part of the raising and
nurturing of that child. 91 Prosecution merely compounds the problem that
criminalization intended to prevent.
D. Wisconsin's Law Is Ineffective in Preventing Welfare Dependence

Sexual activity results in welfare dependence only when pregnancy occurs
and thus welfare dependence is inextricably linked to teen pregnancy. Nearly
all strategies that decrease teen pregnancy would also accomplish the goal of
decreasing welfare dependence. However, the prosecution of all juvenile
sexual conduct as a means for dealing with welfare dependence is
unnecessarily overbroad. As explained above, far from all prohibited juvenile
sexual conduct results in pregnancy. Of that small percentage where
pregnancy results, not all pregnancies result in welfare dependence.
However, like specifically criminalizing pregnancy, criminalizing welfare
dependence has significant problems. Criminalizing the pregnancy of a
juvenile raises public policy concerns whereas criminalizing procreation
resulting in welfare dependence raises constitutional concerns. 92 Overtwenty-year-old jail inmate was identified as the father, and because the girl was seventeen when she
got pregnant, the father was investigated for sexual assault); Katharine Seelye, Ideas & Trends;
Concealing a Pregnancy To Avoid Telling Mom, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997, at D5.
89. WIS. STAT. § 948.22 (2003-2004).
90. See Bruce E. May, Real World Reflection: The Character Component of Occupational
Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon 's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L.
REV. 187, 193 (1995).
91. In the high profile Wisconsin case of Kevin Gillson, see infra note 118, the prosecution can
at least be indirectly connected to causing the end of the relationship. Lawrence Sussman, Gillson in
Touch With Girlfriend,Son, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 1998, at Al. Gillson garnered statewide sympathy in his willingness to quit school to support his new family and the partners' mutual
desire to marry. Id. Although he was sentenced to only probation, the terms of that probation kept
Gillson from visiting his child when the child and the mother moved temporarily to Colorado. Id.
Even when the mother and child moved back to Wisconsin, Gillson could see them only with the
permission of his probation officer. Id.
92. See, e.g., State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 629 N.W.2d 200, cert. denied,
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inclusiveness in criminalizing more than simply welfare dependence is
inevitable, and therefore the problem of welfare dependence is best remedied
through solutions aimed directly at the inextricably linked problem of teen
pregnancy.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE WISCONSIN SCHEME

The most historically consistent rationale for statutory rape laws is to
protect juveniles, generally from the coerced activity that they are not mature
enough to refuse. Moral reasons, although significant to many, are not alone
a rational basis for such an intrusive and punitive law. If teen pregnancy is a
contributing factor to welfare dependence, then both these problems are best
addressed by dealing with the problem of teen pregnancy through alternative
means than criminalizing all sexual conduct among juveniles. Therefore, the
Wisconsin Legislature should reform and refocus its statutory rape laws and
focus upon the single rationale of protecting juveniles from coerced sexual
conduct.
A. Strategiesfor PreventingCoerced Sexual Conduct
1. Age-Gap Provisions
It is intuitive that the risk of coercion is substantially decreased when
partners are close in age, and therefore nearly all states have included an agegap provision in their statutory rape laws. Sexual conduct involving persons
close in age is either non-criminal or punished at a substantially reduced level
in forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and under federal law. 93 Only
537 U.S. 813 (2002); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2000); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 11.41.434(a), 11.41.436(a), 11.41.438(a), 11.41.440(a)(1) (2004); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1407F. (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-1 10(a)(2)(B), 5-14-125(5)(B)(i),
5-14-126(2)(B), 5-14-127(a) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402(1)(d) (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-70(a)(2), 53a-71(a)(1)
(West 2001 & Supp. 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 770(a)(2), 771(a)(1), 772(a)(2)g, 773(a)(5)
(2001 & Supp. 2004); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3008, 22-3009 (2001 & Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
794.05(1) (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(b) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707730(1)(c)(i), 707-732(1)(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODE § 18-1508A(1) (2004);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14.1(2)(c) (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-9 (LexisNexis
2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.4 2.c., 709.12 4. (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
510.050(1)(a), 510.060(1)(b), 510.130(1)(b) (Lexis Nexis 1999 & Supp. 2005); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:43.1.A. (West 1997 & Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 254, 255-A, 260
(1983 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-304(a)(3), 3-306(a)(3), 3-307(a)(3)-(5), 3-
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Kansas, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin do not
utilize some form of an age-gap provision in their statutory rape laws. Agegaps of three or four years are most common, although some
states have
94
adopted age-gaps as small as two years or as large as six years.

2. Victim Cooperation Requirement
A weakness in the age-gap approach is that peer relationships can be
coercive. Another idea for dealing with this problem is making victim
cooperation a prerequisite for prosecution. 95 All underage sexual activity
would be criminal, but prosecution occurs only if a party wants the
prosecution. However, such a law contains its own glaring weaknesses.
There must be a means for discerning which partner was the presumptive
victim. For example, in Wisconsin, if both partners are underage, both actors
are simultaneously victims and perpetrators. Therefore, the addition of a
victim cooperation requirement in Wisconsin would effectively decriminalize
all underage sexual conduct without providing juveniles any protection from
coerced sexual conduct. Female would not cooperate with a prosecution
against Male because Male would then be motivated to cooperate in a
prosecution against Female. Therefore, even if Male felt he was unfairly
coerced by Female, Male would be unable to pursue criminal prosecution
because Female could vindictively pursue prosecution against Male. Both
parties would have no incentive to cooperate because cooperation would
308(a) (Lexis Nexis 2002 & Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.520e(l)(a) (West 2004);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.342-345 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(1)
(2000 & Supp. 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.034, 566.064 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 455-502(3), (5)(b), 45-5-503(3)(a) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320.01(1) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 200.368, 200.364 3.(b) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632A:4 I. (1996 & Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 14-2 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 F.
(LexisNexis 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25, 130.30, 130.35, 130.40, 130.45, 130.50 (Consol.
2000 & Supp. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2(a)(1), 14-27.4(a)(1), 14-27.7A (2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-20-03, 12.1-20-07 (1997 & Supp. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04
(LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1112 (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.345
(2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3122.1, 3126(a)(8) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-6
(2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506(a) (2003 & Supp.
2005); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.11 (b), 22.011 (d) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-5-401(3), 76-5-401.1(2), 76-5-402.2(2) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (2004);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.073(1), 9A.44.076(1), 9A.44.079(1), 9A.44.083(1), 9A.44.086(1),
9A.44.089(1) (West 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-3(a)(2), 61-8B-5(a)(2), 61-8B-7(a)(3), 618B-9(b) (LexisNexis 2005); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-303(a)(v), 6-2-304(a)(i) (2005).
94. COCCA, supra note 57, at 38 tbl.2. 1. This author incorrectly identifies Wisconsin as having
a four year age-gap, perhaps counting the four year age-gap provision included in its sex offender
registration laws as a four year age-gap under its statutory rape laws. See infra notes 118-19.
95. Oberman, supra note 10, at 778-82. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(a) (2003) (requiring
victim cooperation for prosecution).
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motivate the prosecuted party to seek prosecution against the alleged victim.
Although the victim cooperation requirement combined with a means of
identifying the presumptive victim and perpetrator seems initially attractive
because it appears to criminalize only sexual conduct that is not fully
consensual, there remain fundamental flaws in this approach. First, if an
underage person is truly being coerced, then he or she is unlikely to be able to
break free from this coercive grasp to report the abuse. Thus, a cooperation
requirement may fail to protect juveniles in situations where the coercion is
most real and severe. Second, it also allows for vengeful prosecutions. The
scorned lover is able to look back on the relationship and rather than simply
being upset by the pain of lost love or a mistaken sexual relationship, the
regretting partner is able to get revenge upon his or her former partner by
bringing the full force of the criminal law upon them. Consent to sexual
activity should not be determined in hindsight, but prosecutors would have no
effective means for discerning which complaints are motivated by vengeance
and which complaints are motivated by victimization. A law requiring victim
cooperation as a prerequisite would essentially tell actors that sexual activity
with younger persons is an activity done at their own peril. At the younger
person's whim, the older person may face criminal prosecution for a serious
sexual assault when their only misconduct was offending their underage
partner.
B. Strategiesfor Reducing Teen Pregnancyand Welfare Dependence
The risk of welfare dependence is inextricably tied to teen pregnancy, and
over the past decade educational efforts aimed at making young people aware
of the proper use of contraceptives and the potential consequences of sexual
intercourse have greatly decreased teen pregnancy rates. 96 Criminalization,
although an intuitive companion to the new push towards abstinence-only
education, is counterproductive in reducing welfare dependence when it fails
to deter pregnancy. 97 Education rather than criminalization should be the
means by which teen pregnancy and welfare dependence are controlled.
Teen pregnancy was regarded as an epidemic in the early 1990s, but since
that time, with little notice, there has been substantial improvement.9" The
national teen pregnancy rate has dropped thirty percent from 1991 to 2002. 99
96. Nina Bernstein, Behind Fall in Pregnancy, a New Teenage Culture of Restraint, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at Al.
97. See supra Part V.C.
98. Ceci Connolly, More U.S. Teens Delay Having Sex, Study Finds, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
2004, at Al.
99. Id.
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Explanations commonly cited by experts for this reduction include the fear of
AIDS, AIDS-prevention programs, new forms of birth control, changes in
welfare policies, increased child support enforcement, the rise of religious
conservativism among teens, and new sex education programs that stress both
abstinence and contraception. 00 Despite these various explanations, the
answer can essentially be summed up as "less sex, more contraception."10 1
Conspicuously absent from most any list of expert explanations for the
incredible drop in teen pregnancy is increased criminalization. The fact that
states that decriminalize peer sexual conduct and states that criminalize such
conduct observed similar reductions in teen pregnancy rates indicates that
criminalization may be entirely irrelevant to reducing teen pregnancy rates
02
and, rather, the above listed explanations are responsible for the reduction. 1
A simple, yet likely, explanation for the decrease in teen pregnancy rates
is that young people are more aware of the consequences of becoming
pregnant and are consciously choosing to prevent pregnancy. Therefore, it is
possible to conclude that efforts have succeeded in educating young people of
not only the risks associated with sexual intercourse (accounting for the
decrease in sexual activity) but also how to prevent pregnancy should they
decide to have sexual intercourse (accounting for the increased use of
contraceptives).
Recently there has been increased effort to reform this two-pronged
approach into a unilateral effort aimed simply at deterring sexual
intercourse.10 3 This abstinence-only approach has been widely criticized but
commended by conservatives intent upon dissuading any sexual conduct
outside of marriage and believing that instruction on contraceptive use implies
approval of sexual conduct. 10 4 Criminalization is a logical companion to
abstinence-only education in that it gives teeth to the message of abstinence
and provides an additional reason for young people to fear sexual conduct.
100. Bernstein, supra note 96.

101.

Id.

102. For example, Wisconsin's teen birth rate dropped from about 44 per 1000 teens in 1991 to
32 per 1000 in 2002. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Dept' of Health & Human Servs., Births: Final
Datafor 2002, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Dec. 17, 2003, at 9 tbl.B. The demographically similar
state of Iowa, a state that has a four year age-gap for fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 709.4 (West 2005), observed a nearly identical drop from about 43 to 33, Nat'l Ctr. for
Health Statistics, supra, at 9 tbl.B. A comprehensive study investigating a correlation between a
state's criminalization of peer sexual conduct and a drop in teen pregnancy is beyond the scope of
this Comment because doing so would involve accounting for a vast number of variables such as
demography and the actual application and prosecution strategies of the various states.
103. The Bush administration has more than doubled the amount of federal spending on
abstinence-only education programs to more than $170 billion for 2005. Brian Wingfield, Study
FaultsAbstinence Courses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at A22.
104. Id.
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And unlike the risks of pregnancy or disease, there is no means by which to
effectively remove the risk of criminal consequences.
Criminalization is largely ineffective in deterring sexual conduct and
05
counterproductive to reducing welfare dependence should pregnancy result. 1
Although teen pregnancy rates have decreased, the ineffectiveness of the
criminal law in deterring juvenile sexual conduct is evidenced by the
concurrent increase in oral sex among juveniles. 0 6 In Wisconsin, and most
states, oral sex is regarded as legally identical to traditional sexual
intercourse. 107 If it was respect for the law motivating the decrease in teen
pregnancy, the concurrent increase in oral sex would not occur. Rather, the
evidence suggests that alternative explanations than criminalization are
8
responsible for the decreases in teen pregnancy. 10
VII. A BETTER STATUTORY RAPE LAW
Wisconsin's statutory rape laws are in need of reform to better protect
juveniles and to apply the criminal law to punish undesirable conduct in
proportion to the social harm it causes. Child molestation has a distinct
connotation as opposed to statutory rape, yet Wisconsin law does not reflect
this distinction. It is possible to aggressively and harshly punish child
molestation, thus fully protecting juveniles, while relaxing statutory rape
prohibitions. Child sexual assault statutes should exist primarily to protect
juveniles from the sexual predations of older persons. The reduction of teen
pregnancy rates and its collateral impact upon welfare dependence are better
accomplished through means other than criminalizing adolescent and young
adult sexual conduct. Although juvenile sexual conduct is not to be
encouraged, the current prohibitions and punishments are unnecessarily harsh
and overreaching and fail to take into account contemporary reality.

105. See supra Part V.C.
106. Bernstein, supra note 96.
107. Sexual intercourse is defined as the following:
vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between
persons or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or
of any object into the genital or anal opening either by the defendant or upon the
defendant's instruction. The emission of semen is not required.
WIS. STAT. § 948.01(6) (2003-2004).

108. See Bernstein, supra note 96.
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A. Regulation of Children
All sexual conduct between children and adults is prohibited' 0 9 and
should remain so. Sexual conduct involving a child and an adult is the
essence of child molestation and should remain harshly punished. In regards
to peer conduct, unlike other juveniles, children should not be granted the
freedom to engage in conduct with peers. Yet children should not face the
serious sanctions that an adult would. Should two peer children, for example
two twelve-year-olds, engage in some form of sexual conduct, an alternative
means of restraining their conduct should be available and should be one that
does not necessarily bring with it the full force of a delinquency adjudication.
Provided the children are close in age and the conduct consensual then serious
criminal or juvenile sanctions are inappropriate. Substantially reduced
sanctions are appropriate simply as a means for allowing the State to
intervene in the relationship if parents have been unsuccessful in controlling
their children and perhaps order counseling or other intervention as the
situation may warrant. For partners outside that limited age range, significant
sanctions are appropriate given the possibility for the older person, whether
also a juvenile or an adult, to coerce the child.
B. Regulation of Adolescents
Wisconsin's law prohibiting and harshly punishing all sexual conduct
involving adolescents1 10 is in need of substantial reform. Adolescents are
recognized as legally capable of making adult decisions in a variety of
situations.1 ' Yet adolescents do not possess the maturity of an adult. An
adult may be able to take advantage of an adolescent's immaturity and thus
there is a need to protect an adolescent from such predations. But on the
opposite end, an adolescent is capable of making many mature decisions
109. See § 948.02(1).
110. See § 948.02(2).
111. For example, a child as young as ten may be tried as an adult for murder, §
938.183(1)(am), indicating that the legislature believes that such a child may possess the mental
competence to make the very adult decision to take a life. Similarly, any juvenile who is at least
fifteen years old may be tried as an adult for any crime. § 938.18(l)(3). Thus, it is possible that two
fifteen-year-olds could be prosecuted as adults for their consensual sexual relationship. This is
obviously paradoxical; the juveniles face punishment because one law treats them as incapable of
making an adult decision to engage in sexual conduct, yet they are facing substantial punishment
because a separate law treats them as fully competent to make the decision to engage in that conduct.
The paradox is even more profound when involving seventeen-year-olds. Seventeen-year-olds are
always regarded as adults when criminal defendants. § 938.02(1). Therefore, two seventeen-yearolds prosecuted for a consensual act of sexual intercourse, § 948.09, are not only simultaneously
victims and offenders but also simultaneously adults and juveniles.
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including decisions regarding sexuality. 112 Although many may cringe at the
thought of formally extending sexual decision-making authority to
adolescents, the reality is that adolescents are making these decisions every
day. Regardless of criminalization, adolescents do engage in sexual
conduct. '1 3 The issue raised here is whether that conduct should be criminal.
Consensual conduct involving underage partners close in age should be
non-criminal. The legislature should reform Wisconsin's statutory rape laws
and incorporate an explicit age-gap, as nearly every other state has done. 114
Many local prosecutors have informally adopted such policies,' 15 and
although these policies may be effective in preventing some actors from
acquiring felony convictions for their consensual conduct, the fact that other
actors face the full force of the law for conduct that may be ignored in another
county only compounds the injustice.
If the legislature is, for whatever reason, reluctant to formally recognize
the sexual autonomy of adolescents, 116 then at the very least, such consensual
conduct should be criminalized in a new and appropriately titled section
entirely separate from those sections associated with child molestation,
thereby removing much of the unnecessary and unjustified stigma that may
follow an offender.' 17
An eighteen-year-old who impregnates his fifteen-year-old girlfriend" 8
112. If teens were incapable of making mature decisions, then there would be little faith in
restraining teenage sexuality through educational efforts. Educational efforts are predicated upon the
belief that juveniles are competent to make appropriate decisions.
113. High school students, like it or not, are sexually active. Thirty-three percent of ninthgraders report having had sexual intercourse, and by twelfth grade, that number jumps to sixty-two
percent. Ctrs. for Disease Control, Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance-2003, MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, May 21, 2004, at 71 tbl.42.
114. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
115. Cole, supra note 77.
116. For a discussion of reasons why a state may be reluctant to extend such decision-making
authority to juveniles, see Phipps, supra note 1, at 375.
117. See supra Part V.C.; see generally Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling
Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519 (1996).
118. This was the scenario in one of Wisconsin's highest profile statutory rape prosecutions.
Kevin Gillson was eighteen when he impregnated his fifteen-year-old girlfriend. Jeff Cole, Law
Comes Down on Father-To-Be, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 24, 1997, at Al. Gillson was
quickly convicted of sexual assault. Id. Although this case was not especially unique, it motivated a
relative uproar over Wisconsin's regulation of consensual teenage relationships. There was an effort
to amend the state's laws to punish the consensual relationship between a person fourteen or fifteen
years old and a person not more than two-and-a-half years older as only a misdemeanor. A.B. 605,
1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1997); David Callender, Assembly OKs Easing Teen Sex
Penalties, CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 6, 1998, at IA. However, this effort eventually failed, and the law
remained largely unchanged except for an amendment allowing for a sentencing judge to waive the
sex offender registration requirement when the actor is under nineteen and is not more than four
years older than the other partner. Act of Apr. 17, 1998, No. 130, § 6, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 1257,
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must write upon most every job application that he was convicted of the
felony of second degree sexual assault of a child. He may be forced to
register as a sex offender. 119 Even if the offender is a juvenile, law
enforcement may notify the community of the offender's identity and
crime. 120 A conviction for sexual assault of a child connotes to many an act
of predatory child molestation. An average citizen would not regard the
consensual relationship between two fifteen-year-olds as equivalent to the
coercive molestation of a fifteen-year-old by a fifty-year-old, yet Wisconsin
law treats these acts as identical.
C. Regulation of Young Adults
Presently, when the conduct involves a young adult, only sexual
21
intercourse is prohibited and it is punished as only a misdemeanor.1
Although sexual intercourse is still prohibited, such conduct is punishable by
a maximum of only nine months in jail whereas the same conduct occurring
the day before the partner's sixteenth birthday was punishable by up to forty
years in prison. By the younger partner turning sixteen, the couple can now
engage in sexual contact without criminal consequences
and should they
122
engage in sexual intercourse, it is only a misdemeanor.
However, if the sixteen-year-old's partner is younger and that couple
engages in sexually intimate conduct, such conduct remains a felony. But
unlike engaging in such conduct only a day earlier when both partners were
under sixteen, now there is a readily identifiable perpetrator and victim. The
sixteen-year-old is subject to felony prosecution while the younger partner is
1258-59 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 301.45(lm) (2003-2004)); Stan Milam & Lawrence Sussman,
Thompson Signs Kevin Gillson Bill, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 18, 1998, at Al. Gillson was
sentenced to probation, and efforts to obtain a pardon stalled. Jeff Cole & Annysa Johnson, Pardon
for Gillson Viewed as Unlikely, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 27, 2001, at 3B.
119. Until recently, all persons convicted of the sexual assault of a child were required to
register as sex offenders, but the legislature recognized that the need to protect the community was
minimized when the conviction emerged from the consensual relationship of peers and therefore
permitted the sentencing judge to waive the mandatory registration requirement when the offender is
not more than nineteen and the partners are less than four years apart in age. Act of Apr. 17, 1998,

No. 130, § 2, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 1257, 1258-59 (codified at Wis. STAT. § 301.45(lm) (20032004)); Milam & Sussman, supra note 118.
120. Under a recent revision of the law, a juvenile's conviction may now be disclosed to the
public if, in the opinion of law enforcement, "providing that information is necessary to protect the
public." Act of May 2, 2005, No. 5 (to be codified at WIS. STAT. § 301.46(2m)(c)).
121. WiS. STAT. § 948.09 (2003-2004). However, recall that the definition of sexual
intercourse is very broad, see supra note 107, and includes not only traditional sex but also oral sex
and even vulvar penetration by a finger. See § 948.01(6).
122. See § 948.09.
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at most subject to a misdemeanor. The parents of the younger partner or the
younger partner himself may be motivated to pursue a felony prosecution if
upset with the relationship. At worst, the younger partner would be subject to
a misdemeanor but such a prosecution would be unlikely given the age
disparity and the fact that the statutory structure implies that a person under
sixteen should be a presumed victim in a relationship with a person over
sixteen.
Although young adults are granted substantially more freedom than
adolescents and face far less severe penalties, their conduct still carries a
misdemeanor penalty for both partners. This law should also be reformed to
allow for an age-gap provision similar to that proposed for adolescents.
D. Reformation of Other Laws

The sexual conduct of juveniles is regulated by many more laws than
those that explicitly prohibit underage sexual conduct. 123 These additional
prohibitions are often times more absurd than the general notion that criminal
sanctions should be utilized to restrain all adolescents from engaging in any
form of sexually intimate conduct.
Additionally, a juvenile's sexual
relationship may generate criminal liability not only for the participants, but
also for certain individuals who become aware of the relationship.
1. Mandatory Reporting Laws
Because Wisconsin equates the consensual sexual conduct of adolescent
peers with child molestation, when certain individuals become aware of that
relationship, they too may be criminally liable if they fail to notify the police
or fail to prevent the relationship. 124 When certain professionals, such as
those working in health or education fields, become aware of a child or
adolescent's sexual activity, they are required to report this knowledge to
police or child welfare officials. 125 Recognizing that this mandatory reporting
law had the potential to dissuade sexually active juveniles from obtaining
necessary health care such as services relating to sexually transmitted diseases
or pregnancy, the legislature reformed the law to allow an exception to the
mandatory reporting requirements when a medical professional believes the
conduct was consensual. 12 6 However, only medical professionals are exempt.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See §§ 948.02, 948.09.
See §§ 48.981, 948.02(3).
§ 48.981.
Act of July 31, 1987, No. 27, § 941s, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 69, 246-47 (codified at WIS.
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Educational professionals and even mental health professionals are still
required to report when they reasonably suspect that an adolescent or child
has engaged in sexual conduct. 127 Exemptions for educational professionals
were originally included but were vetoed by the Governor. 128 This can lead to
somewhat absurd results. The confused adolescent who believes she may be
pregnant and is unsure of what to do next may confide in and seek the advice
of a school counselor. However, the counselor is required to report his
knowledge. Thus, the result is that unsophisticated adolescents are reported
while those capable of directly seeking medical treatment will never have
their conduct reported.
The teacher who overhears stories of weekend escapades or catches two
enamored students under the bleachers is required to report this conduct to
police or a social welfare agency. 129 Failure to report is punishable by up to a
one thousand dollar fine and up to six months in jail. 130 Health care
providers, although exempt, may report at their discretion, and some health
13
care providers have adopted policies of reporting all known sexual conduct. 1
Additionally, persons responsible for the welfare of an adolescent or
child 132 are required to prevent the sexual conduct from occurring. 133 For
example, should a mother become aware that her fifteen-year-old daughter is
sexually active, although displeased with her daughter's choice, the mother
may feel the obligation to prevent serious harm to her daughter and so takes
her to a doctor for a birth control prescription and purchases and instructs her
daughter on the proper use of condoms. However, because the parent is not
intervening to prevent the sexual relationship, the mother is guilty of a felony
STAT. § 48.981(2m) (2003-2004)). This exemption from mandatory reporting for health care
providers is regarded by some as a model for the rest of the nation. Abigail English & Catherine
Teare, Statutory Rape Enforcement and Child Abuse Reporting: Effects on Health Care Access For
Adolescents, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 827, 855 (2001).
127. See WIS. STAT. § 48.981 (2003-2004).
128. Act of July 31, 1987, No. 27, § 941s, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 69, 246-47 (codified at Wis.
STAT. § 48.98 1(2m) (2003-2004)).
129. See § 48.981(2).
130. § 48.981(6).
131. Megan Twohey, For Sexually Active Teens, ConfidentialityNo Guarantee,MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2004, at IA.
132. "Person responsible for the child's welfare" is defined as the following:
the child's parent; stepparent; guardian; foster parent; treatment foster parent;
an employee of a public or private residential home, institution or agency; other
person legally responsible for the child's welfare in a residential setting; or a
person employed by one legally responsible for the child's welfare to exercise
temporary control or care for the child.
§ 948.01(3).
133. § 948.02(3).
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under Wisconsin law punishable by up to twelve-and-a-half years in prison
and a twenty-five thousand dollar fine. 134 In modifying the adolescent sexual
assault laws, the mandatory reporting laws must also be reformed to exempt
instances involving adolescent peers.
2. Medical Exception
Although medical professionals are exempt from reporting consensual
adolescent sexual activity to law enforcement, individual medical
professionals could be prosecuted for performing routine medical procedures
upon juveniles because of the broad definition of sexual intercourse. 135
Parents could even be prosecuted for allowing the procedure. 136 Wisconsin
should incorporate an explicit
medical exception into its statutory rape laws as
37
many other states have. 1
3. Other Controls on Juvenile Sexuality
Simply reforming the child sexual assault statutes to allow for an age-gap
provision regarding the conduct of adolescents and young adults would be
ineffective because the sexual conduct of adolescents and young adults is
controlled by a variety of other statutes. The statutes are filled with a variety
of apparent contradictions and absurdities, particularly when applied to young
adults.
For example, sexual intercourse with a young adult is a
misdemeanor' 38 whereas showing a young adult pornography is a felony. 139
Similarly, should a person cause a young adult to see or hear sexual conduct,
a felony has been committed, whereas the young adult personally engaging in
such conduct is only a misdemeanor. 140 Finally, if a person directs a young
134. See §§ 948.02(3), 939.50(3)(f).
135. Refer to the definition of sexual intercourse, supra note 107.
136. See § 948.03.
137. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407 A. (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 770(b) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05(1) (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:43.1.B. (1997 & Supp. 2006) (also exempts the "normal sanitary care of an infant"); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-11 B (LexisNexis 2005); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(d) (Vernon 2003 & Supp.
2005).
138. WIS. STAT. § 948.09 (2003-2004).
139. § 948.11(2).
140. § 948.055(2)(b). It is hard to understand how sexual intercourse with a young adult could
ever not violate this statute. Absent physical disabilities or extraordinary measures, a young adult
personally engaged in sexual intercourse is necessarily seeing or hearing the conduct. Therefore,
under current Wisconsin law, sexual intercourse with a sixteen-year-old is arguably not a
misdemeanor, § 948.09, but actually a class H felony, § 948.055(2)(b), punishable by up to a ten
thousand dollar fine and six years in prison, § 939.50(3)(h).

2006]

STATUTORY RAPE IN WISCONSIN

adult to another room in which they intend to engage in sexual intercourse,
this person is guilty of the serious felony of child enticement, punishable by
up to twenty-five years in prison and a $100,000 fine,' 4 1 whereas simply
having sexual intercourse with the young adult is a misdemeanor.' 42 It is hard
to understand why the additional element of partners seeking privacy warrants
the additional felony charge.
An inverse law, a requirement of privacy, may better protect juveniles
from coerced sexual conduct. A juvenile may be more likely to resist the
pressure of an individual peer than he would if faced with the simultaneous
pressure from a group of peers. Therefore, the legislature may draft a statute
that permits two peers to engage in sexual conduct but prohibit the conduct if
others participate in or view the conduct.
The contradictions that exist in Wisconsin law must be remedied,
allowing for age-gap provisions consistent with those in a reformed statutory
rape law. Failure to reform these laws along with the child sexual assault
laws would allow prosecutors to use the above listed laws, which the
legislature likely never intended to be applicable, as a back door for regulating
and seriously punishing the consensual acts ofjuvenile peers.
E. ParentalRestrainingOrders as a Statutory Rape Law Alternative
Parents who disapprove of their son or daughter's relationship are
presently able to utilize the full force of the criminal justice system to disrupt
that relationship, provided that relationship is any more physically intimate
than that in a PG movie. In fact, under current law, parents are not only
empowered but also rather required to intervene and prevent such a
141. See §§ 948.07(3), 939.50(3)(d). Although sexual intercourse with a young adult is not
explicitly listed in the child enticement statute, the child enticement statute is still applicable in the
prosecution of sexual conduct involving young adults. For example, the child enticement statute
specifically prohibits causing a young adult to go to a secluded area for the purpose of "exposing

genitals or pubic area," § 948.10. "[C]aus[ing] a child to expose genitals or pubic area or expos[ing]
genital or pubic area to a child," id., is necessary to most any act of sexual intercourse. Prosecutors
have used a charging scheme similar to this in the high-profile sexual assault prosecution of former
Green Bay Packer Mark Chmura. Lisa Sink & Linda Spice, Chmura Accused of Child Enticement,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 24, 2000, at IA. Chmura was prosecuted for non-consensual sexual
intercourse with a seventeen-year-old and was charged with the additional crime of child enticement
because he allegedly led the victim into a bathroom where the sexual assault occurred. Id. Although
in the Chmura case the prosecutor alleged non-consensual sexual conduct, id., a prosecutor's
willingness to apply the child enticement statute when the alleged victim was seventeen indicates that
it would be applicable even when the underlying charge is one of statutory rape. Chmura was
subsequently acquitted. Shirley A. Wiegand, Sports Heroes, Sexual Assault and the Unnamed
Victim, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 501, 506 (2001).
142. § 948.09.
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relationship. 143 Although parents will generally seek legal intervention only
when doing so will result in the punishment of the partner and not their own
son or daughter, 144 occasionally, parents utilize the law as an intervention tool
of last resort even when it means
that their own son or daughter will be
45
subject to criminal sanctions.
Reforming Wisconsin's statutory rape laws to fully decriminalize
consensual conduct between adolescent peers would deprive parents of this
interventional power. However, the legislature need not maintain criminal
penalties in order to provide parents with legal means for preventing their son
or daughter from engaging in sexual intercourse. A novel approach for
allowing parental intervention would be the development of a sort of parental
restraining order. Under this approach, a disapproving parent who is aware of
or suspects sexual conduct may be able to seek a court order enjoining the
relationship of their son or daughter.
Because the legislature is
constitutionally permitted to prohibit all juvenile sexuality, the process for a
parent seeking to enjoin a particular sexual relationship need not necessarily
follow the formal court procedure that is required for traditional restraining
orders. 146 The process may be streamlined and relatively informal without
raising due process objections because the legislature is simply empowering
parents to control their sons and daughters. Punishments for violation of this
injunction may vary depending upon the facts presented. When both partners
are underage, a juvenile adjudication may be appropriate for a violation. If
one party is an adult, then misdemeanor sanctions equivalent to those relating
to the violation of any other protective order 147 may be appropriate for the
adult while juvenile sanctions may be appropriate for the underage partner.
This intervention technique is superior to the broad and general
prohibition against all adolescent sexual conduct because it is able to be
applied in those situations where the threat of coerced conduct is the greatest.
A parent is in the best position to determine if a relationship is harmful to

143. See § 948.02(3).
144. This would occur, for example, when a parent of a fifteen-year-old reports a relationship
between the adolescent and an adult.
145. Recently, a mother caught her fourteen-year-old daughter naked in bed with a fourteenyear-old boy. Jamaal Abdul-Alim, Teens Have Right to Have Sex, Lawyer Argues, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 2003, at lB. Both fourteen-year-olds freely admitted that they intended to have
sex and challenged the mother to call the police. Id. And so the mother did, resulting in juvenile
charges being brought against both her daughter and the male partner. Id.
146. See, e.g., Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533 (Wis. 1987).
147. For example, a person violating a domestic abuse restraining order may be imprisoned for
up to nine months and fined up to $1000. WIS. STAT. § 813.12(8) (2003-2004). A violation of a
harassment restraining order warrants imprisonment of up to three months and a fine of up to $1000.

§ 813.125(7).
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their son or daughter, and this mechanism would provide a means of
enforcing that belief when traditional parental disciplinary tools have failed.
Additionally, the partners are provided notice that their conduct is prohibited
and are given the opportunity to adjust accordingly, as opposed to the present
system where many adolescents are
completely unaware that their consensual
148
sexual relationships are criminal.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Statutory rape laws developed largely out of an interest to protect young
people from the sexual predations of adults. Although Wisconsin's law
accomplishes this goal, Wisconsin takes the additional step of criminalizing
all adolescent sexual conduct. Adolescent abstinence may be ideal, but it is
not best accomplished by criminalization and most certainly not by treating a
consensual peer relationship as equivalent to a stereotypical case of child
molestation. The many laws regulating the sexual conduct of young adult and
adolescent peers should be reformed to include age-gap provisions, like those
adopted in nearly every other state, thus decriminalizing or criminalizing at a
substantially reduced level the consensual relationships of adolescent or
young adult peers. Should the legislature decide to entirely decriminalize
consensual peer relationships, the innovation of a parental restraining order
would allow disapproving parents a means by which to legally intervene and
prevent an otherwise legally permitted relationship.
Maintaining criminalization is unnecessarily burdensome to those persons
and organizations obligated to report, investigate, or prosecute such conduct.
Lax prosecution motivates disrespect for the law, but full prosecution of
current laws has the potential of turning a majority of high school students
into sex offenders. Wisconsin should reform its laws, refocusing upon
protecting children from sexual exploitation and allow the regulation of
consensual peer relationships to be a matter for individual parents, rather than
government.

DARYL J. OLSZEWSKI

148. Megan Twohey, Teens Who Have Sex Charged With Abuse, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Mar. 8, 2004, at IA.

